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lously honored' test was met, in the in-
stant case, from the facts that the initial 
interrogation took only about twenty 
minutes, that there was over a two hour 
period in between interrogations, that 
Miranda warnings were fully given both 
times and great care was taken both 
times to ensure that Mosley understood 
them, and that the two interrogations 
concerned different and separate factual 
occurrences. Whereas the Michigan 
Court of Appeals viewed Mosley's case 
as factually similar to Westover v. Unit-
ed States, 384 U.S. 436 (a companion 
case to Miranda), the United Staes Su-
preme Court found marked factual 
differences in that Westover involved 
prolonged, sequential interrogations with 
no significant time lapses and without 
any warnings to the arrestee. In essence, 
the Court found no overreaching by the 
state, that Mosley's statement was volun-
tarily and informedly given, and that the 
principles of Miranda were preserved. 
For these reasons, the decision of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals was reversed 
in favor of the state and the case re-
manded. 
Justice White concurred in the result, 
but would have gone further than the 
Court and would have overruled 
Miranda to the extent that the 
" .. . Miranda decision might be read to 
require interrogation to cease for some 
magical and unspecified period of time 
following an assertion of the 'right to si-
lence,' and to reject voluntariness as the 
standard by which to judge informed 
waivers of that right." 44 L. W. at 4020. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice 
Marshall, dissented on the ground that 
" ... as to statements which are the 
product of renewed questioning, 
Miranda established a virtually irrebut-
table presumption of compul-
sion ... and that presumption stands 
strongest where, as in this case, a sus-
pect, haVing initially determined to re-
main silent, is subsequently brought to 
confess his crime. Only by adequate 
procedural safeguards could the pre-
sumption be rebutted." 44 L. W. at 
4021. Justice Brennan would find two 
altemative adequate safeguards to be a 
speedy arraignment or presence of 
counsel. He said: 
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"I do not mean to imply that counsel 
may be forced on a suspect who does 
not request an attorney. I suggest only 
that either arraignment or counsel must 
be provided before resumption of ques-
tioning to eliminate the coercive atmos-
phere of in-custody interrogation. The 
Court itself apparently proscribes resum-
ing questioning until counsel is present if 
an accused has exercised the right to 
have an attorney present at question-
ing." 44 L.W. at 4021, n.4. 
The dissent also feels that the subject-
matter of the two interrogations were re-
lated because the informer's tip for the 
arrest covered both sets of crimes, the 
homicide arose from the factual context 
of a robbery, and defendant had told the 
initial interrogator that he didn't want to 
say "[a]nything about robberies," 44 
L. W. at 4022. That is, the dissent be-
lieves the right to remain silent was 
exercised in a manner to cover the 
subject-matter of the second interroga-
tion. 
In evaluating the Mosley case, it ap-
pears to me that the subject-matter test is 
a non sequitur; i.e., that Mosley stands 
for the proposition that repeated interro-
gations are proper if (I) Miranda warn-
ings are given before each interrogation 
session, (2) there are Significant time 
lapes between sessions, (3) each session 
ceases when the defendant exercises his 
Fifth Amendment rights, and (4) the fac-
tual case-by-case context does not show 
relentless badgering of a suspect in such 
a manner as to coerce his testimory or 
undermine the voluntariness factor es-
sential to an informed and willful state-
ment. As a practical matter, strong limits 
remain upon the ability of the state to re-
peatedly custodially interrogate sus-
pects. These limits include the suspect's 
rights to continually exercise his right to 
remain silent, his right to obtain the assis-
tance of counsel at any stage of interro-
gation, and his right to a speedy hearing 
before a magistrate. Further, excessive 
pressure from the state will still result in 
the inadmissibility of inciminating 
statements. The net effect of Mosley still 
leaves the public interests in police inves-
tigative work in balance with the con-





by Lindsay Schlottman 
In an action brought under 42 U.s.c. 
sec. 1983, the Supreme Court, led by 
Justice Rehnquist, reversed a federal dis-
trict court's attempt to end a pattern of il-
legal and unconstitutional police mis-
treatment of citizens. Rizzo v. Goode, 44 
LW 4095, was decided on January 21; 
1976 and is the resting spot for litigation 
which lasted six years. 
Rizzo began as two separate actions 
(Goode v. Rizzo and COPPAR v. Tate), 
each commencing in 1970, in which the 
principal defendants were the officials 
occupying the offices of Mayor, City 
Managing Director (who supervises and, 
with the Mayor's approval, appoints the 
Police Commissioner) and Police 
Commissioner (who has direct supervis-
ory power over the police department). 
The two suits, permitted to proceed as 
class actions, alleged a pervasive pattern 
of illegal and unconstitutional police mis-
treatment, of minority citizens particu-
larly, and of Philadelphia residents gen-
erally. The defendants were charged 
with conduct ranging from express au-
thorization or encouragement of police 
misconduct to failure to act in a manner 
which would assure that such miscon-
duct would not occur in the future. 
Before the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, forty-odd 
incidents of alleged police misconduct 
were revealed. Hearings lasted twenty-
one days and two hundred and fifty wit-
nesses testified, resulting in findings of 
fact which both sides accepted with re-
spect to thirty-six incidents. {The inci-
dents are detailed in 357 F. Supp. at 
1294-1316). The Supreme Court sum-
marized the District Court's findings as 
follows: 
The principal antagonists in the eight 
incidents recounted in Goode were Of-
ficers DeFazio and D'Amico, members 
of the city's "Highway Patrol" force. 
They were not named as parties to the 
action. The District Court found the 
conduct of these officers to be violative 
of the constitutional rights of the citizen 
complainants in three of the incidents, 
and further found that complaints to the 
police Board of Inquiry had resulted in 
one case in a relatively mild five-day 
sUspension and in another case a con-
clusion that there was no basis for discip-
linary action. 
In only two of the 28 incidents re-
counted in COPPAR (which ranged in 
time from October 1969 to October 
1970) did the District Court draw an 
explicit conclusion that the police con-
duct amounted to a deprivation of a fed-
erally secured right; it expressly found no 
police misconduct whatsoever in four of 
the incidents; and in one other the de-
partmental policy complained of was 
subsequently changed. As to the remain-
ing 21, the District Court did not proffer a 
comment on the degree of misconduct 
that had occurred: whether simply im-
provident; illegal under police regula-
tions or state law; or actually violative of 
the individual's constitutional rights. 
Rizzo, supra at 4097. 
After sifting through all these facts, the 
District Court found that although no 
policy to violate the legal and constitu-
tional rights of the plaintiff classes was es-
tablished, there was evidence that de-
partmental procedure tended to dis-
courage the filing of citizen complaints 
against the police and to minimize the 
consequences of police misconduct. Re-
garding the plaintiff class of Philadelphia 
residents, the District Court further 
found that although only a small percen-
tage of police violated legal and constitu-
tional rights of the Philadelphians, the 
frequency with which violations occur-
red was such that "they cannot be dis-
missed as rare, isolated instances." 357 
F.Supp., at 1319. 
The District Court concluded by or-
dering (in 1973) the defendants to draft 
a "comprehensive program for dealing 
adequately with civilian complaints" and 
the Court suggested gUidelines such as 
"(1) Appropriate revision of police man-
uals and rules of procedure spelling out 
in some detail, in simple language, the 
'do's and don'ts' of permissible conduct 
in dealing with civilians ... (2) Revision 
of procedures for processing complaints 
against police .... " 357 F.Supp. at 
1321. 
As a result of this order, plaintiffs and 
defendants expanded the police de-
partment's two and one half page direc-
tive for handling complaints into a four-
teen page document which reflected the 
revisions suggested by the District Court 
gUidelines. This document was incorpo-
rated into the District Court's final judg-
ment and the City Police Commissioner 
thereafter was req uired to enforce the di-
rectives contained in the document. 
The defendants appealed the order 
and final judgment of the District Court 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, claiming that the federal 
judiciary was intruding into the dis-
cretionary authority committed to the 
defendants as public officials by state 
and local law. In 1974, the Third Circuit 
upheld the District Court'sfindings that 
the police department's existing proce-
dures for handling citizen's complaints of 
police misconduct were "inadequate;" 
further, it affirmed the District Court's 
choice of eqUitable relief, stating "The 
revisions were ordered because they 
appeared to have the potential for pre-
vention of future police misconduct." 
Goode v. Rizzo, F.2d , (CA3, 
1974), cited in Rizzo, supra at 4096. 
Petitioners appealed the affirmation of 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Supreme Court, in reversing the 
judgment of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the decree of 
the District Court, analyzed liability 
under 42 U.s.c. sec. 1983, the basis of 
the class actions. Section 1983 provides 
that: 
Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other persons 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the de-
privation of any rights, privileges or im-
munities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the person in-
jured in an action of law, suit inequity, or 
other proper proceedings for redress. 
The Supreme Court stated that "The 
plain words of the statute impose 
liability - whether in the form of pay-
ment of redressive damages or being 
placed under an injunction - only for 
conduct which 'subjects or causes to be 
subjected' the complainant to a depriva-
tion of a right secured by the Constitu-
tion." Rizzo, supra at 4098. As far as 
such conduct was concern, the Su-
preme Court saw no causal connection 
between the complaints and the indi-
vidual respondents. Individual police of-
ficers who were found to have violated 
constitutional rights were not named as 
party defendants; only a few of the indi-
viduals whose rights were violated were 
named as party plaintiffs. Also, "As the 
facts developed, there was no affirma-
tive link between the occurrence of the 
various incidents of police misconduct 
and the adoption of any plan or policy by 
petitioners - express or otherwise-
showing their authorization or approval 
of such misconduct." Rizzo, supra at 
4098 
The Court entertained "serious 
doubts" that an. Article III "case or con-
troversy" was made out. Rizzo, supra at 
4098. In discussing O'Sea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488 (1974) and Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme 
Court pointed out that in the Rizzo case 
the respondents' claim to "real andim-
mediate" injUry rested only upon what 
one of a small anonymous group of 
police officers might do in the future be-
cause of that officer's perception of de-
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partmental disciplinary procedures. The 
Court stated, "insofar as 'the individual 
respondents were concerned, we think 
they lacked the requisite 'personal stake 
in the outcome,' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962), i.e., the order over-
hauling police disciplinary procedures." 
Rizzo, supra at 4098. 
The conclusion that no Article III 
"case or controversy" existed would 
perhaps have ended the matter, noted 
the Court, but the District Court's certifi-
cation of the plaintiff classes bridged the 
gap between facts revealed at the tiral 
and classwide relief sought under sec. 
1983. The Supreme Court, however 
disagreed with the District Court's hold-
ing that a section 1983 action was made 
out based on the showing of an "unac-
ceptably high" number of incidents of 
police misconduct, there being shown 
twenty incidents in a city of three million 
people and seventy five hundred police 
officers. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 
(1939),Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 
(1974), and Lankford v. Gelston, 364 
F.2d 197 (CA4, 1966) were distin-
guished from Rizzo. In Hague, there 
existed deliberate policies of public offi-
cials, implemented by force and vio-
lence, to deprive plaintiffs of constitu-
tional rights. In Medrano, "a single plan" 
and "a pervasive pattern of intimida-
tion" by public officials which resulted in 
suppression of constitutional rights were 
revealed. Medrano, supra at 812. In 
Lankford, a plan conceived by public of-
ficials was implemented which resulted 
in the flagrant deprivation of constitu-
tional rights of citizens. The Supreme 
Court decided that the facts in Rizzo 
showed no plan or pattern by public offi-
cials to deprive plaintiff class members of 
their constitutional rights; further, the 
Court found untenable the District 
Court's conclusion "that even without a 
showing of direct responsibility for the 
actions of a small percentage of the 
police force, petitioners' failure to act in 
the face of a statistical pattern" was en-
joinable under sec. 1983. Rizzo, supra at 
4099. The Court concluded that "Under 
the well-established rule that federal 
'judicial powers may be exercised only 
on the basis of a constitutional Violation,' 
Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16(1971), this 
case presented no occasion for the Dis-
trict Court to grant equitable relief 
against the petitioners." Rizzo, supra at 
4100. 
Principles of federalism were also dis-
cussed by the Court as it rendered its de-
cision. The Supreme Court, noting that 
the District Court's order and judgment 
sharply limited the police department's 
handling of its internal affairs, decided 
that the District Court departed from the 
duty of the federal courts to be "con-
stantly mindful of the 'special delicacy 
of the adjustment to be preserved be-
tween federal equitable power and state 
administration of its own law.' " Sten-
fanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117,120 
(1951), quited in O'Shea v. Littleton, 
supra at 500. 
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